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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW DATED

JUNE 9, 1980

(pp. A324-A33I)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT '
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SHALE DWORAN,

Plaintiff,
-againstMOTION PICTURE LABORATORY TECHNICIANS
LOCAL 702, INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE
OF THEATRICAL STAGE EMPLOYEES AND
MOVING PICTURE MACHINE OPERATORS OF
THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, An
unincorporated association, COSMO
VITELLO, as President of Motion
Picture Laboratory Technicians, Local
702, International Alliance of
Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving
Picture Machine Operators of the
United States and Canada, an unincorporated association, and
TECHNICOLOR, INC.

78 Civ. 1181(PNL)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Defendants.

PIERRE N. LEVAL, U.S.D.J.

This is an action brought by a discharged employee,
Shale Dworan, against his employer Technicolor, Inc., alleging
wrongful discharge.
Along with other defenses, the employer raises
the objection that the arbitration clause of the collective
bargaining agreement bars plaintiff from proceeding otherwise
than by arbitration. Plaintiff counters that during discussions
over the dispute, the employer repudiated the arbitration
agreement and therefore cannot be heard to invoke it as

a bar.
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Over plaintiff's objection, trial was conducted
without a jury on the limited question whether plaintiff
can show that the employer repudiated the arbitration clause.
Both sides agree that by reason of the arbitration clause,
plaintiff cannot prevail in the action without showing repudiation by the employer. I find that plaintiff has failed to
show such repudiation and accordingly remit plaintiff to
such remedies as may remain to him at arbitration.
The facts are as follows:
On August 24, 1977 Oworan was discharged from
his position with Technicolor. Plaintiff then requested
his union, Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians Local 702,
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and
Moving Picture Operators of the United States and Canada
("IATSE"), to take his claim of wrongful discharge to arbitration.

However, the Executive Board OA. Local 702 voted on

September 13, 1977, not to take the matter to arbitration.
The plaintiff then initiated a series of unsuccessful intraunion appeals in February 1978. While an appeal to Local
702's parent, IATSE, was pending, Steven Spivak, Esq., counsel
to IATSE, contacted Local 702's attorney, Gerald Schilian,
Esq., and suggested informally that Local 702 attempt to
arrange for the arbitration of the plaintiff's dispute with
the employer.
For reasons set forth on the record I found that
trial of the question of repudiation of the arbitration
agreement by the employer was wholly severable from, and
did not involve common issues of fact with, the trial of
whether plaintiff had been discharged wrongfully. I found
that the question whether plaintiff was entitled to be freed
from the contractual provision requiring arbitration by
reason of his employer's repudiation was essentially an
equitable dispute not giving rise to the right to jury trial.
2
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In response to the suggestion, Schilian ascertained
on February 15, 1978 that Eric Schmertz, the permanent industry
arbitrator under the collective bargaining agreement between
the employer and Local 702 in effect from October l f 1974
to September 30, 1977, was available for arbitration on
February 22, 1978. The agreement provided that, unless unavailable or unwilling, Schmertz was to conduct all arbitrations
arising in the industry under the contract. Schilian informed
plaintiff's counsel that he intended to seek the employer's
agreement to arbitrate the plaintiff's discharge before
Schmertz on February 22. But plaintiff's counsel informed
Schilian that plaintiff did not wish to arbitrate before
Schmertz and asked Schilian to attempt to arrange for arbitration
before a different arbitrator. Apparently in an earlier
dispute involving plaintiff, Schmertz has rendered a decision
which plaintiff regarded as unfavorable to him.
Schilian called the employer's counsel, Eric Rosenfeld,
Esq., to discuss the matter. Rosenfeld declined to make
any agreement. He expressed the view that the Local, by
its refusal to seek arbitration in September, had waived
the right to have the matter arbitrated. He wrote to Schilian
on February 16, 1978 as follows:
Technicolor has not agreed and does not agree to arbitrate
the matter of Oworan's discharge last August, and reserves
all rights and positions with respect to any claims
by Local 702 or by Mr. Dworan that either the collective
bargaining agreement then in effect or the collective
bargaining agreement presently in effect, requires
arbitration now over that discharge.

J
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The Local never took the matter any further. The
Local and the plaintiff understood that the arbitration
provided for in the contract called for Schmertz as arbitrator,
but the plaintiff did not want Schmertz. The position expressed
by the employer made it clear that, inter alia, it would
not agree voluntarily to conduct an arbitration in a manner
not required by the contract as would have been the case
if a substitute arbitrator were sought. The Local thereafter
made no demand for arbitration.
On March 6, 1978, the plaintiff sent a letter
to the employer noting the employer's "refusal to arbitrate"
and demanding reinstatement. The employer did not respond.
On March 16, 1978, plaintiff brought action in
this court against both the Local and the employer, alleging
respectively unfair representation and wrongful discharge.
Summary judgment had been granted in favor of the Local
before the action against the employer came to trial. Two
motions by the employer for summary judgment had been denied,
one on the ground that the question of repudiation presented
triable issues of fact.
Where a party is found to have repudiated an arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement, it
can no longer insist on compliance with that or related
provisions, see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). Proof
of repudiation requires more than evidence of a disagreement
between the employee or union and the employer regarding
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whether or not a given dispute is arbitrable, see Rabalais
v. Dresser Indust., Inc., 566 F.2d 518, 520 (5th Cir. 1978).
Repudiation has been found where arbitration procedures
have been ignored, see e.g., E.T. Simonds Constr. Co. v^
Local 1330, 315 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1963); Radiator Specialty
Co. v. Cannon Mills, 97 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1938), or where
one party has raised an unjustifiable bar to proceeding
with arbitration notwithstanding that the dispute in question
is clearly arbitrable, see Lane, Ltd, v. Larus & Brothers
Co., 243 F.2d 369 (2d Cir.

1957). See also 6A A. Corbin,

Contracts $ 1443 (1962) (cited with approval in Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. at 185) (question of good faith).
The plaintiff contends that the employer's counsel's
letter of February 16, coupled with the employer's failure
to reply to plaintiff's counsel's March 6 reinstatement
demand, establishes repudiation by the employer -of the arbitration provision. I disagree for the following reasons.
A first reason why the employer's statements did
not amount to repudiation of the arbitration agreement is
that the context in which these statements were made was
not a discussion of arbitration in the form required by
contract. It appears that the discussion between Schilian
and Rosenfeld included the question whether Technicolor
would "agree" to an ad hoc non-contractual arbitration before
an arbitrator other than the one called for by contract.
Rosenfeld's statements in his letter that Technicolor "does
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not agree to arbitrate" make sense only in this context.
For the employer's agreement is in no way required when
arbitration is invoked under the contract. The agreement
being sought was to engage in a procedure not contractually
required.
Refusal to submit to
a procedure not required
«
<
by contract cannot properly be interpreted without more
as refusal to submit to the procedures which are required.
Second, the Local never demanded or initiated
arbitration. All it did in February was to discuss the
possibility with the employer.

2

I recognize full well that

on appropriate facts a repudiation may occur without a demand
having been made. For example/ this might be so where the
words or conduct convey a clear refusal to arbitrate, and
particularly so where the reasons given in justification
are baldly inadequate
or smack of bad faith. Nothing of
s *
. * * *- • .
the kind happened here.
i

.

"•.-•-,'•-.

•

-Rosenf eld's conversation with Schilian and his

< -j ~

subsequent letter conveyed the view that if arbitration
were invoked a valid procedural defense of waiver by the
2

The procedure for invoking arbitration under
the collective bargaining agreement involved filing a written
notice of dispute and, under the 1974 agreement, a written
reference to Eric Schmertz. Plaintiff's contention that
industry practice was for references to arbitration to be
made informally was contradicted by the proof. The evidence
showed that during the course of the collective bargaining
agreement, arbitration had been initiated exclusively through
this formal mechanism. In fact, arbitration of the plaintiff's
claim following his 1976 discharge was initiated formally
by a written reference to Schmertz.
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Local would lie. These communications did not amount to
statements that the employer would not show up if arbitration
were invoked. To the contrary, as I interpret them, they
meant and were understood to mean, that the employer would
show up and would defend, at least initially, on the ground
that waiver should prevent the arbitration from reaching
the merits. Indeed, plaintiff's counsel testified at trial
that part of his reason for seeking to maintain the action
in court rather than at arbitration was because he anticipated
that the arbitrator would be more inclined to sustain the
defense of waiver. If anyone repudiated the arbitration
contract, it was not the employer, but the plaintiff, who
did not wish to have his case judged by the contractually
agreed arbitrator and who furthermore believed he would
get a more sympathetic decision in a federal court.
As plaintiff's counsel conceded on cross-examination,
Technicolor's position to the effect that a defense of
waiver would prevail to defeat an arbitration on the merits
was neither frivolous nor in bad faith.

See 6A Corbin,

/
v.

supra. Technicolor had been significantly prejudiced by
the delay from the time in September when the Local refused
to arbitrate to the time in February when it reopened the
issue. An adverse decision in February would have involved
six months rather than three weeks of back pay liability.
In the meantime, furthermore, Technicolor had hired a replacement
for plaintiff.

The fact that this replacement employee
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had not yet acquired permanent status under the collective
bargaining agreement may mitigate but does not dispel the
prejudice. The firing of the probationary employee might
well have invited litigation or at least caused poor labor
relations.
Under the circumstances, I find that the employer's
conduct did not constitute a repudiation of the collective
bargaining agreement.
The complaint is accordingly dismissed in its
entirety.

SO

O R D E R E D :

Dated: New York, New York
June 9 , 1980

Pierre N. Leval
U.S.D.J.
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Glushien

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, Administrator

In the Matter of the Arbitration between :
Du Art Film Laboratories/ Inc.,
•

: Case No. 1330 0203 79

-and-

:

OPINION

and
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians, Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.,
AFL-CIO

:
:

Appearances

For the Company:
Poletti, Freidin, Prashker,
Feldman & Gartner, by
Eric Rosenfeld, Esq.
For the Union:
Gerald Schilian, Esq.

Before:

I

Morris P. Glushien,
Arbitrator

AWARD

OPINION

The undersigned was designated as Arbitrator
under the procedures of the American Arbitration Association to resolve a dispute between Du Art Film Laboratories, Inc. ("Company") and Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians, Local 702, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO ("Union").

Hear-

ings were conducted on six days between June 12, 1979 and
October 9, 1979, at which the parties presented their
evidence, examined and cross-examined
stated their positions.

witnesses, and

At the final hearing the Union

made a full closing statement.

Subsequently the Company

filed a comprehensive brief to which the Union made a
written response.

The main issue before me is whether the proper
manning for simultaneously operating two side-by-side
machines, the Gevachrome (t60) and the ECN II (#61) , is
five men as the Company claims, or six men as the Union
contends.

A second issue is whether the Company is enti-

tled to damages for the period in which the Union allegedly, by threat of strike, refused to permit the five-man
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operation desired by the Company.

I uphold the Union's

position that the five-man crew is improper/ and I also
deny the Company's claim for damages.

The Company is a leading motion picture film
processing laboratory in the City of New York.

It does

large-scale commercial work, and is one of a number of
such enterprises which have been in contractual relations
with the Union for decades.*

For a number of contracts

prior to the current 1977-1980 agreement, the industry
contract named a "permanent arbitrator" to resolve disputes, first Joseph E. McMahon, then Eric J. Schmertz.
The current agreement contains no such permanent designation, which accounts for my ad hoc selection in the instant case.

Under the collective agreement as well as longtime industry practice, there are two sets of developing
classifications, positive developing and negative developing.

The collective agreement sets forth a set of wage

rates for the jobs in the positive developing department
and another higher set of rates for those in the negative

*

The contract is jointly negotiated but separately signea by
each participant.
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developing department.

The wage rates in the latter are higher

because the responsibilities, skills, and care required of the
workers are greater since they are handling irreplaceable
original film material where a mistake is fatal, which is not
the case in the preparation of positives or duplicate
positives.*

The contract also contains a provision regarding the
minimum manning of color negative developing machines.

It

requires a three-man crew for handling one machine and a
five-man crew for two such machines operating in tandem.

On a

single machine there is a wet end man, a dry end man, and a
bridge man who acts as relief for each o- the others at
lunchtime and other needed occasions.

On the tandem operation,

the machines have the same complement of wet end and dry ena
men, but there is merely a single bridge man to service both
machines; he stands on a common bridge and relieves each of the
other four as needed.

While the contract contains no explicit provision as
to the crew size of positive color developing machines, the

*

Not surprisingly workers in the positive developing department generally aspire to be promoted to the negative department with its higher wages.
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parties are in accord that by industry practice the same manning requirements that apply to.negative machines apply also
to positive developing machines, both as to a positive machine
operating alone and as to two positive machines operating in
tandem.

Turning now to some pertinent history, the New York
industry in the years through the 1940's had worked only on
black and white film.

In the early 1950's the Company became a

pioneer in the Nev; York market in color development.

To ac-

complish this, it acquired two machines that are referred to in
the record as the #1 and the |2 machines.

Each machine had the

capacity to develop negatively and positively, depending on the
chemical baths used.

The two machines, which had a common bridge, were
operated in tandem by a crew of five.*

This was by agreement

between the Company and the Union, first tacit and subsequently
in writing.

As the Company president himself testified, the

great majority of the work performed by the machines was positive, but the machines also ran negative some of the time, and

*

This is a precedent on which the Company heavily relies in
the instant case as we shall see.
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on occasions one machine ran positive while the other ran negative and vice versa.

Important to note, however, is that the

basic five-man crew -- although the large bulk of theit work
was positive on both machines -- were paid at the (higher)
negative rate for all their work.*

The tandem operation of the

fl and $2 machines by the basic crew at full-time negative
rates continued for twenty years from 1954 to 1974.**

At this point reference should be made to a decision
by Arbitrator McMahon of August 23, 1968, on which the Company.
places stress.

The decision involves the |2 machine above

mentioned, and another machine, the |3, which could only do
positive work and, operating by itself, had used a crew of
three.

A breakdown having occurred on the £1 machine, so that

it could not operate in tandem with the f2, the Company sought
to operate the 12 in tandem with the |3, using a crew of five.

*

A significantly lesser amount of work was done on the machines on another shift, again by a five-man crew, but there
each man was paid according to the type of work he was doing
at the time, positive or negative.

** In 1974, the Company acquired a color negative ECN II machine which plays a part in the instant dispute and is discussed hereafter.
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The matter came to arbitration, and the Arbitrator
decided against the Company, holding that the |2 and
the £3 must each have a complement of three men.

Some

of the language he used, from which the Company
advances an argument to which I shall later refer, is
as follows:
"A personal examination of the Company's
three developing machines, the testimony and
evidence, establish quite conclusively we do
not in this situation have a three machine
unit. Machines #1 and #2 constitute a unit,
and the parties agree that the crew complement for this unit is five men. We have an
entirely different condition with respect to
Machine #3, which was designed, installed and
operated as a single unit with a three man
crew. This conclusion is further supported
by the fact that the bridge between #3 and #2
is considerably lower than the common bridge
between #1 and 12, and such bridge was not
planned as, nor does it constitute, a common
bridge (emphasis added).
"The Company testified that Machines #2
and #3 were never operated as a.pair. In
addition, it appears that no attempt was made
prior to the breakdown of Machine fl to operate t3 and |2 or 13 and #1 with five men."
Another decision by Arbitrator McMahon dated July 14,
1966, upon which the Company also relies, may well be mentioned
at this point.

A little while earlier, the Company had acquired

a new type of color reversal processing machine, the Pako.

This

machine developed first a negative image and then produced a
positive print.

A controversy arose with the Union whether the
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workers should be paid at positive rates or negative, ana whether the proper complement -for the machine was two men or
three.

Arbitrator McMahon, declaring that because of its dual

capacity a color reversal machine "does not fall squarely within
either the Positive or Negative Developing Department" (ana
consequently was not covered by the contract provision relating
to negative developing), nevertheless decreed that negative
rates should apply inasmuch as a negative image was originally
produced, but that from the evidence before him "a two-man crew
is sufficient to operate the Company's Pako machine."*

And .now, with the foregoing as background, we come to
events which pose the problem in this case.
••
In 1969 the Company acquired another type of color
reversal processing machine, the Gevachrome |60 (which is one or

*

Years later, on August 17, 1977, Arbitrator Schmertz who haa
succeeded McMahon handed down a similar decision with respect to another kind of color reversal development machine,
the Photomec. He held that the McMahon Award of July 14,
1966 was "binding" in its determination that color reversal
development was not comprehended in the contract provision
concerning negative development. Arbitrator Schmertz so
held although apparently he himself might not have reached
the McMahon result initially, as indicated by his statement,
"Whether Mr. McMahon was correct is immaterial."
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the machines involved in the present controversy).

Unlike the

Pako and the Photomec machines abovementioned, it has at all
times been manned by a crew of three.

This is so because, as

Arbitrator Schmertz held in an Award dated December 18, 1969,
the parties had agreed years earlier, when color development
was first introduced, that color machines with attached "applicators" (which the Gevachrome has too) should be run by a crew
of three throughout its operation even though the applicators
were not being used some of the time.

The Award accordingly

rejected the Company's position that two men sufficed for the
Gevachrome without its applicators.

Thus the Gevachrome has always had a crew of three.
And what, in my view, is vitally important to note is that,
whatever the machine's innate capacity to perform other work
too, it has in fact been used only for the purpose of making
positive duplicate prints --

with the three-man crew being

paid at positive, viz., the lower, rates.

In 1974, five years after acquiring the Gevachrome
160, the Company purchased an ECN II color negative processing
machine, referred to in the record as the #62.
machine up next to the Gevachrome.

It set the

The new machine was

strictly a negative machine, and it is undisputed that the
contract specified a crew of three for its operation.

However,

the parties made a special arrangement for operating the
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machine in some circumstances by a crew of two men who, as the
quid pro quo, were paid premium rates.

The special arrangement

continued until it was cancelled on September 22, 1978, with
the operation reverting to a three-man crew performing the
negative work at contract negative rates.

Throughout this period as noted, the Gevachrome #60
and the ECN #62 were operated disjunctively and never as a
tandem unit.

The Gevachrome had its own crew of three

performing positive duplicate work at positive rates; the ECN
#62 had its crew of two producing negative prints and receiving
premium rates under the special arrangement, or its crew of
three receiving the contract negative rates.

Meanwhile, in early 1978, the Company had acquired
another ECN II negative machine, referred.to as the #61.

As

the Company avowed at the hearing, it had ordered the machine
in 1976 and received it in 1978 with the intended purpose -which it admittedly did not communicate to the Union -- of
setting it up in a tandem unit with the Gevachrome #60 so as to
operate the two machines together with a crew of five.

After receiving the #61, the Company spent some months
getting the machine ready for operation.

Then, in September
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1978, it installed it at the site where the #62 had theretofore stood (next to the Gevachrome #60), moving the #62 over
just beyond the newly installed #61.

Thus the three machines

in sequence were the Gevachrome #60/ the ECN #61, and the ECN
#62.

The Company did something else too at the time it
fashioned this arrangement.

It constructed two common bridges,

one between the #60 and the #61, the other between the #61 and
the #62.

This made it possible for a bridge man to place

himself between either set of two machines.

What the Company

had in mind (again without telling the Union) was to operate
the #60 and the #61 in tandem with a five-man crew, or to
operate the #61 and the #62 in tandem with a five-man crew,
whichever was the cheaper method at a particular time.

Thus,

if all three machines were operating simultaneously, the
Company would "tandem" the two negative machines, the #61 and
the #62, paying negative rates to the five men on these
machines, while paying positive rates to three men operating
the #60.*

*

But if only the #60 and the #61 were operating, and

There is no dispute that this would be perfectly proper
under the contract which, as we have seen, specifically
allows tandem operation of two negative machines.
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the #62 was not, then the Company planned to operate the #60
and 161 in tandem, paying negative rates to the two men on the
#61 and to the bridge man, while paying positive rates to the
two men on the 160.

This, as i say, is what the Company envisaged

(but dia

not communicate) when it built the two common bridges in
September 1978.

But for about five months thereafter until

nearly the end of January 1979, it did not act on the plan.
Instead, it operated the #60 with a three-man crew who were
paid positive rates, and the #61 with a three-man crew who were
paid negative rates; and it so used these six men even when
both machines were operating simultaneously.

Then, on January 26, 1979, with no notice at all to
the Union, the Company attempted to effectuate its design.

It

ordered that the #60 and the #61 be operated in tandem with a
five-man crew -- and this order the men refused to obey.

Vvhat

is more, the men threatened job action to shut down all operations if the five-man order were implemented.

And throughout

the succeeding months, the employees did not change their
stance.
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There is a good deal of conflicting testimony in the
record regarding the Union's participation in the men's refusal, the Union maintaining that the men acted altogether on
their own and that the Union had no hand in or responsibility
for their action.

However, one would have to.be naive inaeeo

to accept this view.
_

_

- --

—

I am convinced from the evidence that the
'

'"

"

~

~

"

~

"~ "
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Union, through President Charles Vitello and more directly
through Steward Mitchell Demrovsky, instigated, led ana at the
very least condoned the men's conduct.

It might be appropriate at this point to note that in
discrediting the Union's testimony on this aspect, I am equally
unbelieving of the Company's testimony on another subject.

A

top official testified that he did not notify the Union and
take up with it in advance the five-man tandem operation of the
160 and #61 because he thought that "there was no problem" and
that it would constitute "normal operating procedure" in light
of the Company's past history with other machines.

It seems to

me inc reel ible^ that this was really his view and the basis for
his silence.

I say this in view of the vital distinctions

between the past operations and the contemplated one, distinctions which he must surely have recognized and to which I shall
soon address myself.

•
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Coming back now to January 26, 1979, and the weeks
immediately following, the Company took no disciplinary action
when the employees refused to operate the #60 and the #61 in
tandem.

Instead the Company continued to operate each machine,

as it had before, with a three-man crew, and meanwhile it held
discussions with the Union.

The matter was not resolved,

however, and on February 17, 1979, the Company filed for
arbitration.

It sought a ruling from the arbitrator declaring

the tandem operation to be proper, and also an award of damages
because of the compelled use of six men when in its view it was
entitled to operate with only five.
•.
And now we come to the Company's basic arguments, two
in number, for its claimed right to utilize a five-man crew to
operate the #60 and the #61 in tandem.

The first argument is

founded on the fact that the contract, particularly as
interpreted by the 1966 and 1977 decisions of Arbitrators
McMahon and Schmertz (supra, pp. 6-7) , contains no
classifications or rates for the processing of color reversal
film, which is the type used in the Gevachrome #60.

The other

argument is predicated on the assertion that under many, many
years of practice, the Union has recognized and acceded to the
Company's right to use the tandem operation which the Union now
challenges.
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I have given most careful thought and consideration to
the Company's views/ expounded at length in its well-written
brief, but conclude that its position in both respects-is
lacking in merit.

1.

I shall consider the two matters in sequence.

It is true that the contract, as construed by the

two arbitration decisions, contains no provision
particularizing classifications or rates for work done on color
reversal film.

But it hardly follows from this that the

Company is left at large to compel its employees to work on
color reversal film in whatever classifications ana at whatever
rates the Company unilaterally chooses to impose.

Ana even it

arguendo it were so entitled, it surely does not toilow that
the Company is also given freedom to tie together in a tandem
relationship a color reversal machine assumedly unregulated by
the contract with a negative ECN machine which undeniably is
regulated and covered by the contract.

As to the initial part of what I am saying, that the
Company is not to be deemed at large and given carte blanche on
classifications and rates for color reversal work, one need
only look at the two arbitration decisions to which the Company
refers.

While both Arbitrators held that the existing contract
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provisions on Negative Developing did not apply to color
reversal film (which was to be deemed in a class by itself
absent any contractually negotiated provisions tor such film),
yet it was not the Company by fiat but the Arbitrator wno fixed
the appropriate complement and the rates for doing the color
reversal work there involved -- two men on the machine ana
payment of negative rates in each of the cases.

Likewise, in

the decision regarding the Gevachrome -- the very color
reversal machine that is involved in the instant case -- it was
the Arbitrator who fixed a complement of three men when the
Company desired to use only two (sjupra, pp. 7-8).

Since this then is true as to a color reversal machine
standing alone, it is doubly true when the machine is coupled
with a negative machine that is clearly controlled by the
contract.

The Company has no more absolute right than does the

Union to fix the complement for the two machines operating as a
pair.

Rather it devolves upon the Arbitrator to determine the

proper complement upon all the circumstances presented.

I

reject the Company's assertion that "In the absence of any such
provision [a contract provision specifically covering color
reversal work] the Company remained free under the contract ana
the McMahon and Schmertz awards to determine crew for the #60
and #61 machines run as a pair."
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2.

The issue of course remains what complement I

should appropriately fix for the two machines operating
together.

The Company, as its second argument, cites

historical events over a lengthy period of time which it
asserts are controlling precedent for a five-man tandem
operation of the #60 and #61.

I find to the contrary,

upholding the Union's view (a) that the cited happenings differ
basically from the instant case; and (b) that a look at the
particular history of the machines here involved calls for a
six-man, not a five-man crew.

(a)

The Company's principal citation is the

1954-1974 history of the #1 and #2 color development machines
which, with Union consent, were operated in tanaem by a
five-man crew for these twenty years (supra, pp. 4-5).*

In my

view, however, the situation there is of little persuasive
force for the instant circumstances.

*

The Company also cites the history of certain earlier black
and white development machines, but the considerations which
lead me to reject the pertinency of the #1 and |2 events
apply to the black and white machines too.
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It is true that on occasion the §1 or the #2 operated
negatively while the companion machine operated positively, so
that the five-man crew was at that point intermingling both
kinds of work.

But this was a minor and distinct exception to

the major operation.

For the great bulk of the time both

machines were operating positively, a situation in which a
five-man tandem operation is admittedly normal and proper.

Not

only that, but the basic five-man crew was at all times paid
the higher negative rates, even though almost all their work
was positive -- an obvious trade-off for the Union's allowing a
crew doing essentially positive work to perform the small
amount of negative work when it was needed.

This seems to me a

far cry from the present case where the Company proposes to
place in tandem a machine doing only positive work (the #60)
and another machine doing only negative work (the #61) -- and
beyond that paying the lesser positive rates to two of the men
in the five-man crew.

There is yet another reason why, even if the two
situations were more parallel than they are, the #1 and £2
operation would not constitute a meaningful precedent for the
Company's #60 and #61 attempt.

At the time in the fifties when

the #1 and #2 color machines were introduced, the Company was
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the innovator in bringing color film development into the New
York market, and the Union was.willing to grant concessions to
help bring this about.

Had the Union insisted upon one crew to

handle the color positive work and a separate crev/ to do the
color negative work, the Company would not have gotten into
color work at all, as the Company President himself testified.
Besides, since the amount of negative work was quite small, it
would have been a form of featherbedding for the Union to
demand a separate crew just to do that work.

In these circumstances, it is plain to me that the #1
and 12 case differs markedly from the instant one.

A situation

where the Union gave the Company a break to help it introduce
color work is scarcely a controlling precedent when the Company
is now well established in color operations.

(b)

Having concluded that the Company's view of

controlling past practice is deficient, I examine the otner
side of the coin.

Here I find in accord with the Union that

the history of past operations, particularly with respect to
the machines here involved, dictates a six-man and not a
five-man crew for the $60 and f61.
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As we have seen, the Gevachrome £60 was acquired in
1969.

Under the award of Arbitrator Schmertz, it maintained a

crew of three men at all times (supra, pp. 7-8), a crew which
made duplicate positive prints, were considered to be in the
Positive Developing Department, and were paid positive rates.
In 1974 the Company acquired the ECN 162 negative machine,
placing it right next to the #60.

It manned the machine at all

times with men in the Negative Developing Department, either
two men receiving premium rates (above contract negative) unaer
a special deal with the Union, or else three men receiving
contract negative rates.

The point that leaps to mind immediately is that the
#60 and #62 were operated disjunctively and not in tandem for a
period of four years, from 1974 to 1978.

Nor did the Company

even attempt to build a common bridge between them, as the
Company President testified could easily have been done.

Then starting in September 1978, when the Company
placed a different ECN negative machine, the #61, next to the
Gevachrome #60 (this time building a common bridge for the two
machines), it continued for nearly five months to operate the
two machines disjunctively/ each with its own crew of three men
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or a total of six.

It was only at this point that the Company,

out of the blue, took it upon itself to change course and order
the two machines to be operated in tandem with a crew of five.

This history, it seems to me, is enough to demonstrate
that the Company acted outside the proper bounds in directing a
tandem operation.*

This would be so even if the collective

agreement had no provision directly applicable.

It is all the

more certain when the contract specifically states

(Section

"The parties agree that present methods of
operation within the laboratories shall continue
without change" [with certain exceptions not
applicable here].

*

I am unimpressed by the Company's argument (citing the
McMahon decision of August 23, 1968, supra, pp. 5-6) that by
building a common bridge between the #60 and #61 in
September 1978, it acquired the right to introduce a tandem
operation. First of all, it waited five months before
attempting to do so. And second, even if it had acted
immediately, I would not accept the thesis.
I do not read
the McMahon statement (which to a degree is dictum) as
meaning that a Company may operate any two machines in
tandem whenever it builds a common bridge; rather I take his
statement to mean that the absence of a common bridge
constituted still another factor why a tandem operation was
there improper.
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- The foregoing is in my view sufficient to determine
the result.

Nevertheless I would like to add another facet

that reinforces the validity of the conclusion I reach,

I refer to the fact that in the long history of this
industry there appears never to have been an instance

(at least

involving larger firms such as the Company)* in which a firm
has been permitted to work with a five-man crew in a tandem
operation when one of the machines was producing positive work
exclusively and the other machine was producing negative work
exclusively.

Throughout the industry the practice has been to

keep negative and positive work separate and not to commingle
the tasks.

Thus to permit it here would be going directly

counter to what has been a decades-long practice in the
industry/ and would upset what everyone heretofore has taken
for granted.

*

As a top official of one of the major firms

The record does show one instance where the Union permitted
a small firm, which did not have enough manpower and which
the Union wanted to keep alive, to operate a color reversal
machine and a color negative machine in tandem.
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testified, it has not been done and would be ^unethical" were
positive work and negative work to be operated in tanaem.*
(
^
•
^
^
•
"
"
^
"
"
^

""^•••^••••M^m^™™^**"™1""'*1""'**-

" •

•
"
«
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For the reasons stated, I reject the Company's claim
that it is 'entitled to operate the Gevachrome (#60) and the ECN
II (#61) in tandem with a five-man crew, and uphold the Union's
position that three men are required on each machine or a total
of six.

The issue of damages is eliminated by the result I
have reached.

Since the Company's damage claim is based on the

compelled use of a supposedly unnecessary sixth man, my holding
that" a sixth man is necessary washes away the claim.

An Award will be entered accordingly.

*

He also declared that to dp this would be "suicidal^. I
"might add that,because both parties asked me to retrain
from evaluating the feasibility of a tandem operation of the
#60 and #61, I have not done so, although there was a
considerable amount of testimony bearing on that question.
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AWARD

I hold that the Company's grievance against the Union
is lacking in merit, and I award and direct as follows:

1.

The proper manning for the simultaneous

operation

of the Gevachrome (#60) and the ECN II (#61) machines is six
men as the Union contends, not five men as the Company claims.

2.

The Company"is not entitled to any damages

because of the refusal to permit a five-man operation.

Dated:

New York, New York
July 17, 1980

Morris P. Glushien
Arbitrator.

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

:
SS.
:

On this 17th day of July, 1980, before me personally
came and appeared MORRIS P. GLUSHIEN, to me known and known to
me to be the individual described herein and who executed the
Award herein, and he duly acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
Case No. 1330 0108 83
In the Matter of the Arbitration Between *
TECHNICOLOR, INC.

^

OPINION & AWARD

and
MOTION PICTURE LABORATORY TECHNICIANS, «.
LOCAL ?02_L I.A.T.S.E.. AFL-CIO
_
APPEARANCES :
For the Employer
Poletti, Freidin, Prashker & Gartner
by Eric Rosenfeld, Esq.
For the Union
Gerald Schilian, Esq.
At the commencement of the hearing before me on
March 30, 1983 at the New York City offices of the American Arbitration Association, the Employer proposed that
the issues to be arbitrated were:
1. May the Employer operate a Film Line
black and white positive developing machine with two men rather than with three
as demanded by the Union?
2. Is the Employer entitled to damages
as a result of the Union's compelling
the Employer to use three men on that
machine?
The Union refused to accept the wording of the proposed issues but agreed that the hearing should proceed
and that I, as arbitrator, shall determine the nature
\

of the controversy which was presented to me.
Both parties were present at the hearing and were*
afforded an opportunity to present evidence and argument
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in support of their respective contentions.

Post-hearing

memoranda were received from both parties.
The Contract
The following provisions were referred to by one
or both of the parties as pertinent to this controversy:
Article 15(h). Pending the final determination of any dispute, there shall be
no strike or lockout, nor shall there
be any change of working conditions or
methods of operation as they existed prior
to the dispute except as they may be otherwise permitted by this Agreement.
Article l?(b). The parties agree that
present methods of operation within the
laboratories shall continue without change,
except its operations from a single to a
dual operation of machines, so that one
operator may operate two machines, provided
such dual operation is presently or may
hereafter be in existence in a laboratory
operating under a collective agreement
with the Union. In the event of any such
change the Employer will pay the base
rate applicable to such dual operation.
(c). Employer shall be permitted to install and operate new, unusual and reconstructed equipment, and accelerate the
speed of existing equipment after negotiating wages and conditions with respect
thereto with the Union. In the event
that Employer and the Union shall fail
to agree within ?2 hours after Employer
shall request such negotiations as aforesaid, then the matter shall be deemed in
dispute and referred to arbitration, as
provided in Section 15. Pending the decision of the arbitrator, Employer shall
have the right to operate such new, unusual, reconstructed or accelerated equipment and the decision of the arbitrator
shall be retroactive to the date of such
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operation. However, if such new, unusual,
reconstructed or accelerated machinery or
equipment is the same as presently or may
hereafter "be operated in any other laboratory with which the Union has a collective
"bargaining agreement then the Employer
shall have the right, upon notification
to the Union and upon the mutual agreement
that said machinery or equipment is the
same, to operate such equipment in the
same manner as the other laboratory upon
payment of the base rate of wages applicable to the machine or equipment operated
in such other laboratory. In the event
that the Employer and the Union fail to
agree within ?2 hours that said new machinery or equipment is the same, then the
matter shall be deemed in dispute and referred to arbitration, as provided in
Section 15.
(d). As to new, unusual, reconstructed or
accelerated machinery or equipment or dual
operation of machines introduced in a laboratory after October 1,- 19?2, the Employer
will notify the Union in writing. The procedures of (b) and (c) above shall then
apply. Such operation of the new, unusual,
reconstructed or accelerated machinery or
equipment or dual operation of machines
introduced after October 1, 1972 may not
be used as a precedent by any other Employer unless such operation^-has been agreed
upon between the first Employer and the
Union, or has been decided by an arbitrator,
or the continued operation of such equipment
has been permitted by the Union without protest after written notification has been
given.
Background Facts
The Employer operates a film processing laboratory
for both color and black and white film servicing both
«

the motion picture and television industries.
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It is one

of several establishments in the New York metropolitan
area engaged in this type of "business whose employees
are represented by the Union.
At present, the Employer utilizes four developing
machines, two of which are machines for developing color
film, one is a spray machine for black and white positive
film and the fourth, which is involved in this controversy, is a Film Line black and white positive developing
machine.
The color developing machines are operated by three
men when only one machine is used or by five men when
both machines are in use simultaneously.

The third or

fifth operator is utilized to -relieve the other operators
during coffee and lunch breaks so as to permit continuous
operation.

The individual also monitors an "applicator"

which enhances the sound track and which is installed on
color film machines but not on black and white machines.
The spray machine for positive black and white film
processing is a small old machine usually operated by two
employees.

According to the Employer, this machine is

presently being considered for either replacement or reconstruction because its process is too slow and obsolete.
«

The Film Line machine has been used for various
purposes since about 1970.

Up until 1977 the machine was

manned "by three operators and was used for developing negative color film.

At that time, the negative color process

became obsolete and the machine was converted for positive
color developing.

From May 1979 to October 1980, the ma-

chine was converted to positive black and white developing.
The machine was operated sporadically at that time and a
three man color crew was used on the machine when there was
a need for positive black and white processing.

In 1980,

there was a major reconstruction of the machine to a new
color positive process.

The reconstruction which took

eral months was completed in October 1980.
machine was operated by a three man crew.

sev-

Again, the
At the end of

January 1983 the machine was -converted to its present positive black and white process.
The hearing testimony indicated that the initial
conversion of the machine in 1977 or 1978 from black and
white to color developing involved changes in gears, wiring
and tank configurations.

Similarly, the 1980 changes from

black and white to color were considered to be major,.

On

the other hand, changes of the machine from color to black
and white processing only required the dumping of the old
developing solutions, cleaning of tanks, changing gear^
I

speeds and bypassing of the application which is used only
«

with color film.

The color to black and white conversion

is usually done within three or four days by in-house main-
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tenance employees and,allegedly, does not involve the more
comprehensive changes which were needed for color processing
in the past.
The Current Controversy
At the end of January 1983• the Employer notified
the Union that it was converting the Film Line machine to
black and white processing and that it intended to use a
two man crew to operate the machine.

The Union president

responded that the question of utilizing a two man crew
would have to go to arbitration and that until there was
an arbitrator's determination, three men would have to be
used on the machine because the Film Line machine had always
been manned by three operators.'

The Employer presumed that

it had no choice but to operate the machine with three
operators pending the outcome of this proceeding. It stated that
it feared a job action in view of the Union president's comment that he would hate to have to shut down the plant if
only two men were used to operate the machine.
Apparently, since the most recent changeover, the
Film Line machine has been used intermittently.

For about

five weeks after the changeover the machine was in use only
40$ of the time.

At the time of the hearing it was estimated

that the machine was in operation for only about three hours
a day on three days a week.
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The Employer presented several witnesses from competing firms also under contract with this Union.

A

Precision representative testified that when it operated
its black and white machine part time, three or four hours
a day, it only utilized a two man crew.

When it operated

on a continuous full time basis, a third man was utilized
to cover breaks and lunch periods.
A DuArt representative testified that it operates two
black and white machines only with two man crews.
machines

The

are shut down during lunch and break periods.

A Guffanti representative testified that it operates
four black and white machines continuously with two three
man crews.

Each three man crew operates two machines

simultaneously.

Only if one of the two machines is temor-

arily out of service for repairs, will the three man crew
work on one machine.

The Guffanti machines, however, were

described as old machines which operate at a slow rate of 4-0
feet per minute as contrasted to the 180 feet per minute
operation of the Technicolor machine in question.
The Union president testified that throughout the industry all black and white machines are alike.

Yet, he also

distinguished between single strand machines which are run
«
by three operators as contrasted to spray machines which, in
«

accordance with a 1959 arbitration award, are operated by two
men.

He pointed out that spray machines are much smaller
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than the black and white machine involved in this proceeding.
Th e Emplover's Arguments
The Employer contends that, in effect, it was intimidated by the Union president to utilize three men
on the machine pending the outcome of this arbitration
proceeding.

It also pointed out that this Union has had

a history, ten and twenty years ago, of engaging in selfhelp threats and actions at other laboratories when it
disagreed with actions taken by those employers.

Here, allegedly,

the Union president had stated that he would hate to shut
down the Employer's operations if the Employer attempted
to operate the machine with only two men.

The Employer

alleges that utilizing the third man on the machine costs
a total of $3,^47.66 over a five week period.

It seeks

an award which would grant it damages in that amount.
The Employer relies on Articles 15(h) and l?(c) and
(d) of the contract which, allegedly, permits it to adopt
the type of manning utilized by competitive laboratories
for black and white machines.

In this respect, it pointed

out that the president of the Union had characterized all
black and white developing machines as being essentially
alike and that the contract makes no distinction between
spray machines and the Film Line machine.

As the machine

in question, which allegedly has been reconstructed, is
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similar to the machines operated "by competitive laboratories then, according to the Employer, it should "be permitted to use the same type of manning which is applicable
to the black and white developing machines operated by
those other laboratories.

The Employer believes that

type of manning to be a two man crew for non-continuous
operation of the machine.
Finally, the Employer argues that as the machine
had been reconstructed there was no existing method of
operation which could be continued.

It considered its

prior operation of the machine with a three man crew to
be irrelevent because it operated the machine on a sporadic basis and because it unilaterally assigned a three
man color developing crew to the machine without consulting the Union.
The Union's^Arguments
The Union makes two primary arguments, first that
the machine had not been reconstructed so that the Employer was obligated to continue the practice of using a
three man crew and second, that there was no strike or
other job action to coerce the Employer so that no Award
of damages is warranted.
«

It points out that the Film Line machine has been
in use since 1970, always with a three man crew.
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It denies

that the changeover which was made in January 1983 from
color to "black and white positive developing constituted
a reconstruction of the machine which would permit a review of the manning requirement for the machine. Allegedly,
that changeover only required the emptying of the tanks
containing the developing solutions and the disengagement
of the applicator, "both of which had been done in a couple
of days "by an in-house work crew.
The Union contends that the contract requires the
continuation without change of the existing methods of operation as the machine had not been reconstructed.

It

points out that the long standing manning applicable to
this particular machine was with a three man crew and that
no consultation with the Union was necessary either in
the past or in the present to legitimize the manning of
the machine with three operators.
Insofar as the damage claim, the Union questions
the propriety of the Employer's reliance on National Labor
Relations Board decisions of ten and twenty years ago involving other employers to buttress its contention that the
Union had a propensity for coercion.

With respect to the

situation involved in this proceeding, the Union points,.
«

out that there was no strike or other job action and that
*

the Employer was contractually bound to continue using
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three operators on the Film Line machine.

It, therefore,

seeks a dismissal of the Employer's claim for damages.
Discussion and Conclusions
The Employer relies greatly on the characterization
made by the Union president that all "black and white developing machines are essentially alike.

It therefore

argues that the Employer is being placed in a non-competitive position if other laboratories can operate their
I

black and white machines with two men while it is compelled
to use three employees.

I do not know in which respect

the Union president believed the black and white machines
to be all alike.

The available evidence indicates that

the spray machines are small, old and slow, as contrasted
to the Film Line machine which is large and fast, operating
at a speed of 180 feet per minute.

Along the.same lines,

the Guffanti representative testified that although a three
man crew operates two machines simultaneously in that laboratory, the speed of their machines are only ^-0 feet per
minute.

From the evidence,'I conclude that although the end

product of the machines may all be alike, the speed of the
Film Line machine makes it much more productive, even with
a three man crew then either this Employer's spray machine
or the Guffanti black and white developing machines.
The primary question to be answered, in my opinion,
is whether the January 1983 modification of the Film Line
machine constituted a "reconstruction" within the meaning

of the contract.

If the machine had been reconstructed

and the reconstructed machine was similar to machines
operated by other laboratories, then the Employer could
operate the machine with two men, unless otherwise directed
by an arbitrator.

If it had not been reconstructed, the

status quo ante, or operation with three men, appears
to be required by the contract.
There is little guidance for making a determination
of what constitutes reconstruction.

Here, 'the only

available evidence is that the January 1983 modification
consisted of emptying the solution tanks and disengaging
the applicator which is not needed in black and white
developing work.

The modification apparently was accom-

plished in a couple of days by in-house employees.

This

is in sharp contrast to the modification made in 1980
from black and white to color developing where the work
was described as a major reconstruction which took a
number of months.

At that time, new wiring, gears and

tanks were installed and parts had to be designed and
manufactured in order for this machine to be able to do
color work.
Based on the available evidence, it is obvious,
considering what took place in 1980, that one can assume
that the Film Line machine had been reconstructed at that
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time.

What took place in 1983 with the machine, however,

hardly compares in scope with the 1980 changes.

In 1983,

apparently, nothing was rebuilt and little time, comparatively, was spent in making the changeover from color to
black and white.

Under such circumstances, I conclude

that there was no reconstruction of the Film Line machine
and the Employer was contractually obligated to continue
utilizing three men for operating the machine, as was the
continuous practice for that machine in the past, regardless
of whether the machine was being utilized for color or
black and white developing.
I find little merit in the Employer's arguments
that the past use of a three man crew was a unilateral
act by the Employer without having consulted the Union
or that the three man crew utilized in the past on the
Film Line machine was actually the crew assigned to another color machine who, in order to avoid the layoff of
one man, were kept intact as a crew when they were occasionally assigned to work the Film Line machine.
Neither argument is persuasive.

Binding practices fre-

quently are established by the unilateral actions of an
employer.

Where such practice is followed openly and con-

sistently over a period of time without any objection by
the Union, it does become binding on both parties unless
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there is a specific contrary contract provision which
covers the subject.
I find no existing contract provision which specifies the number of operators to man a Film Line machine.
I also find that the Film Line machine when used in the
past for black and white developing work has been consistently manned with three operators.

Therefore, it

is my opinion that the Employer was obligated to continue
utilizing three operators on the Film Line machine after
it modified that machine in January 1983 "to perform black
and white developing work.
In the absence of any evidence that the Union had
conducted any strike or other job action in January 1983
and in view of my conclusion that the Employer was obligated to utilize three operators for black and white
developing work on the Film Line machine, the Employer's
claim for damages for being compelled to operate the
machine with three operators is without merit and is
denied accordingly.
Therefore, the undersigned to whom this controversy
was submitted, hereby makes the following
A

W

A

R

D

1. The Employer is obligated to utilize
a three man crew for the operation of the
Film Line machine for black and white posi-

tive developing work.
2. The Employer is not entitled to any
damages from the Union.

NATHAN COHEN, Arbitrator

Dated:

June 28, 1983

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NASSAU

nn:

Pursuant to Section 7507 of the New York State Civil
Practice Law and Rules, I hereby affirm that the foregoing is my AWARD in the above-captioned matter„

NATHAN COHEN, Arbitrator
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Re:
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-andLOCAL 702, I.A.T.S.E. ,
"Union"
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For the Company:
POLETTI, FRIEDAN, PRASHKER & GARTNER
William E. Malarkey, Esq., Of Counsel
For the Union:
Gerald Schilian, Esq.

Kay 6, 1983

BACKGROUND
This grievance protests the Company's refusal to
permit P. Schreiber to return to his prior Negative Vault
Man-Active position.

The Union claims the Company's action

violated the Agreement.

It asks that Schreiber be awarded

that job retroactively (to December 1982) and that he be
made whole for lost wages.
The basic facts are not in serious dispute.
Schreibcr's service with the Company dates from March 1979.
Initially, he was classified as a Can Carrier.
moted to Splicer.
Man-Active.

He was pro-

He was again promoted to Negative Vault

That position is in the Vault Department.

For

many years, the basic crew there has consisted of three men,
including a Working Foreman (J. Falciano).
In April 1982, Schreiber was bumped out of his
Negative Vault Man-Active position by G. Frank.*

Schreiber,

in turn, bumped back to a Splicer position in the Raw Stock
Department.
In December 1982, the Company hired V. Sadano.

It

classified him as a Negative Vault Man-Active and assigned hi:
to the Vault Department.

He became the fourth member of the

*Frank has suffered a heart attack in 1979 and had, upon his
recovery, been placed on a less taxing job in another department. He was well enough in April 1982 to return to the
Vault Department. His right to have displaced Schreiber is
not at issue.
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crew there.

That gave rise to this dispute.
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

The Issue
The parties failed to stipulate to a specific issue
at the hearing.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the central

question posed here is whether the Company improperly failed
to reassign Schreiber to his former Negative Vault Man-Active
position in December 1982.
The Agreement
Article 7 deals with Work Distribution and Layoffs.
Section (c) (i) thereof reads:
" In the event of a layoff in any
department consisting of more than
one classification, if an employee
in a higher classification shall
first be affected by such layoff,
such employee affected, having
departmental seniority shall have
the option to be reverted to the
next lower classification in the
department in accordance with his
departmental seniority or accept
severance pay and the employee
finally displaced shall be laid off.
In the event the employee affected
was transferred from another
department or classification within
the plant, he shall have the option
of reverting to a position in his
former department or classification
and retain his accumulated seniority
in such former department or classification. In no event shall an
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employee be transferred to r.nother
department unless he had previously
been employed in that department."
Position of the Parties
The Union stresses that the Company chose to increase
the crew in the Vault Department from three men to four.
was under no obligation to do so.

It

However, once it opted to

do so, it insists it should have permitted Schreiber to "push
back" to his former job before anyone was hired from the street.
In support, the Union relies heavily upon C. Vitello's
testimony.

He has been a Union official for the last 18 years.

He noted that Article 7 (c) (1) has been part of the industrywide Agreement for over 30 years.

The "standard procedure," he

asserts, has always been to permit employees to revert to jobs
from which they had been bumpc'd before going to the street for
a new hire.

The practice, he states, is referred to throughout

the industry as a "push back."

Vitello is unsure as to whether

any "push backs" have occurred at Du Art.

But he knows th^t

other firms in the industry have not strayed from the "standard
procedure."
The Union recognizes that the Company regards Sodano
as a "super numerary."

That is, as someone simply being trained

to replace Falciano who is scheduled to retire soon.

It also

notes that the Company insists it has no "need" for a fourth

employee in the Vault Department except for that purpose.
the Union's view, that argument lacks merit.

In

It contends

that the terms of the Agreement must be observed at all times.
Once the Company chose to add another Negative Vault Man-Active
position, it believes it was obliged to offer that job to
Schreiber before hiring from the street.
In support, the Union points to a 1969 decision by
Arbitrator E. Schmertz in a case involving Movielab.
Company Exhibit 1.)

(See

He ruled, it maintains, that employees do

have recall rights to their prior positions.

That ruling, it

argues, has application throughout the industry.

It is con-

sistent with the Union's view of the "standard procedure" in
the industry.

The Company, in any event, failed to establish

that a different practice has existed here.

Under the circum-

stances it argues the Company should be bound by the industrywide practice.

It asks that Schreiber's claim be upheld.

The Company disagrees sharply.
arguments.

It raises several

First, it asserts that there was no real need for

a fourth employee in the Vault Department.

The volume of work

there has remained constant for the past 15 years.

If Sodano

had not been hired, there would not be a fourth man there today
It decribes his role as that of a "supern jmerary. "

He was

hired to replace Falciano, who is due to retire soon.
doing nothing more than training for that job.
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He is

Second, it relies upon the Schmertz Award.

It states

he found the Agreement did not by its terms afford recall rights
However, he found the parties had established such a right by
practice when a need (however brief) existed for an employee to
fill a job in a higher classification.

It regards the Schmertz

Award as limited to situations in which a need exists for an
employee to fill a job.

Here, it insists, no such need existed.

Nor has any practice developed at Du Art.

It asserts I have no

right to establish a recall right when one has not been arrived
at either contractually or by practice.
Third, even if an industry-wide practice exists, the
Company contends it is not bound by it.
to support that view.

It cites several cases

(See Brief pp 12-14.)

Fourth, the Company stresses that the Union must bear
the burden of proof here.

It simply has failed to establish

a contractual violation occurred.

At most, it has alleged the

Company's action is inconsistent with the practice of other
employers.

However, it failed to document that allegation.
Fifth,

the Company asserts the equities of this case

do not support the Union's position.

It suggests that had it

not agreed (at the Union's behest) to treat G. Frank specially,
it would not find itself in arbitration.

Were it not for those

special arrangements, it states, Frank would not have been in a
position to displace Schreiber from the Vault Department in
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April 1982.

Schreiber would, in other worus, still have been

in the Vault Department in December 1982 and this grievance
would never have arisen.
Finally, the Company asserts that to return Schreiber
to the Vault Department would be a vain act.
no more than a pyrrhic victory for the Union.

It would create
For it would

simply promote Sodano to Supervisor and reduce the Vault
Department staff back to three (i.e., Falciano, Frank and
Grossman).
For all of these reasons, the Company asks that the
grievance be denied.
Opinion
On balance, I believe this grievance must be denied.
There are several reasons which lead me to that conclusion.
To begin with, the Company correctly notes that the
Union bears the burden of proof here.

It must establish that

Schreiber's contractual rights have been violated.

It simply

has not met that burden.
Article 7 (c) (1), as I read it, is limited in scope.
Its first sentence deals with a layoff in a department which
contains more than one classification.

It provides tbat an

affected employee in a higher classification has two options:
(1) he may bump down to the next lower classification in the
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department in accordance with his departmental seniority; or
(2), he may select severance pay.

The terms of Article 7 (c)

(l)'s first sentence simply do not apply here.
layoff in the Vault Department

There was no

in December, 1982.

The second sentence of Article 7 (c) (1) provides
that if an employee affected by a layoff was transferred to
his (expiring) job from another department or classification
within the plant, he has the option of reverting to a position
in his former department.

That text served as the basis for

Schreibcr's return to a Splicer job when he was displaced from
the Vault Department by Frank.

He was, in short, granted re-

version rights when he was affected by a lay-off.

In this case,

there was no layoff from the Raw Stock Department in December
1982.

Schreiber, accordingly, had no right to invoke Article

7 (c) (l)'s second sentence at that time.

It did not establish

for him a right then to revert back to the Vault Department.
The simple truth is that Article 7 is silent upon the
question of what happens to an employee bumped from one department when a vacancy reopens in that department.

As Arbitrator

Schmertz noted in 1969, "...the contract is silent on the procedure for recall from reversion."

At Movielab, he held, a

practice existed wherein reverted employees were accorded a righi
to return to their former jobs.

However, that practice, plainly

applied only "when work again [became] available."
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(F. 3)

It is worth noting that the Schnu.rtz Award was issued
in 1969.

Several contracts have been re-negotiated since then.

The Union, however, never succeeded in closing an obvious gap
in Article 7 (c) (1).

(The record, in fairness, does not re-

flect whether it tried to do so.)
I am not entirely convinced that Sodano is simply
a "supernumerary."

The fact that he holds a bargaining unit

job title (classification) and is covered by the Agreement
strongly suggests otherwise.
Falciano.

He may be "in training" to replace

But it is less likely that that is all he is doing.

I am, accordingly, willing to presume for the purposes of this
case that work in the Negative Vault Man-Active classification
did exist in December 1982 when Sodano was hired.
The real question, then, is whether the past practice
referred to by Arbitrator Schmertz in the Movielab case is necessarily binding at Du Art.
is.

I am not prepared to

rule that it

Not, in any event, where not a single instance of a "push

back" has been shown to have occurred there.
could not point to any specific examples.
is that there were none.
testimony of R. Smith.

Certainly, Vitcllo

The reason, undoubtedly,

That, at least, is the unrebutted
He knew of no instance when an employee

who had been reverted per Article 7 (c) (1) was granted a recall
right to his former job.

Nor did his research uncover any.

I have no reason to quarrel with the Union's assertion
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that a "push back" practice exists elsewhere in the industry.
However, I cannot conclude that such a practice must be imposed upon this Company.

After all, the very essence of a past

practice is the mutual agreement that a particular situation
should be dealt with in a certain way whenever it occurs.

That

has not happened here.
Under the circumstances, I am obliged to deny the
grievance.
AWARD
The grievance is denied.

STANLEY L. AIGES, Arbitrator
DATED:

July 30, 1983

STATE OF NEW JERSEY )
: SS.
COUNTY OF BERGEN
>
On this 30th day of July,

1983, before me personally

came and appeared Stanley L. Aiges, to me known and known to me
to be the individual who executed the foregoing instrument and
who acknowledged before me that he executed the same.
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GAIL VALENTINE
A Notary Public o! Ne* Jersey
My Commission Expire? Jan 7, 1987

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 I.A.T.S.E.
OPINION AND AWARD
and

Technicolor,.Inc.

ox

r

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the collective bargaining agreement when it denied William Cohen the
option of reverting to the Chemical Mixing
Department on December 2, 1983? If so what shall
be the remedy?

,

A hearing was held at the offices of the Union on December '•
20, 1983 at which time Mr. Cohen, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and
I

Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity
i

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The Union and

Company filed post-hearing briefs.
The Company is correct in its assertion that Section 7(c)

i

(1) of Llie contract does not give the grievant the right of
reversion he seeks.

To revert to the Chemical Mixing Department

;

from the Vault Department is to move from a lower rated job to a
i

higher rated job. By its clear language, Section 7(c)(l) accords
a right to "revert to the next lower classification...." (emphasis
added).

Hence, assuming that the other conditions of Section 7(c)

(1) were met, the reversion which the grievant claims in this
case is barred by that express language.

,* :*

i

-2However this does not mean th.^t the parties could not waive i
or amend that restriction and agree, on an ad hoc basis, to a

i
right of reversion under different circumstances. A bi-lateral
agreement between authorized representatives of the parties that
is different frosv the contract is enforceable

in the situation

covered by that .agreement, and constitutes a valid contract

variation.

'(
*

*

That is what the probative evidence shows happened here.

i

At the intervention of the Union and in lieu of dismissal for

i

repeated offenses, and any protest of that dismissal, the

:

grievant was demoted and transferred to the Vault Department
from the Chemical Mixing Department. Based on express discussions,
.
the Company agreed that in the. event of a layoff in the Vault
i
Department (where the grievant had low seniority) the grievant i
would be allowed to revert to the Chemical Mixing Department.

i

The evidence on this point, from the Union's testimony is
I
sufficiently unequivocal, clear and convincing to be accorded
i
credit.

The Company's testimony in rebuttal is insufficient.

Specifically, the testimony of Messrs. Vitello, Perdikakis
|
and Voepell of the Union as well as that of the grievant persuade
me that with the grievant"s demotion to the Vault Department
Mr. Pesato of the Company accepted the condition that if the
grievant was laid off from the Vault Department he could return
to his previous job in the Chemical Mixing Department.

Mr.

Pesato's testimony was that he "did not recall" or "had no
recollection" of any such understanding, and in response to what

<Q!

•• T-x" *'?
i

i»if

|

-3would happen if the grievant was laid off from the Vault that
"he'd deal with that at the time it happened."
those statements wit^> a flat denial.

I do not equate

The probative evidence,

therefore, supports the Union's version of what took place when
•
the grievant was demoted to the Vault from Chemical Mixing. 1
am not prepared to conclude that there was false testimony under
oath.
Under the foregoing circumstances, and limited to the facts
in this case, I find that the grievant had the right to revert
to the Chemical Mixing Department when he was laid off from the
Vault Department.

I find that the special arrangement agreed to

between the Union and Company, though at variance from the contract language, is an enforceable variation of the contract
applicable to this case, and falls within the stipulated issue
in this matter.
Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Permanent Arbitrator in the contract between the above named
parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company violated the collective bargaining agreement as varied in this case by an
agreement between the Union and the Company,
when it denied William Cohen the option of
reverting to the Chemical Mixing Department
on December 2, 1983.
The Company shall accord the option to Mr.
Cohen, and if he exercises it, he shall be
returned to his previously held job in the
Chemical Mixing Department and made whole
for the time lost since December 2, 1983,
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less his earnings, if any, from gainful
employment elsewhere during the period
involved.

DATED: January 16, 1984
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J/r Schtnertz
Permanent Arbitrator
/

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

•»./>.
*
' ''

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY
66-Duart
3/22/84

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

E.J.

Local 702 I.A.T.S.E.

Schmertz

OPINION AND AWARD

and
Du Art Film Laboratories
The dispute involves the suspension, the involuntary transfer to the day shift and the subsequent discharge of Mr. Rafael
Salinas.
A hearing was held on March 19, 1984 at which time Mr.
Salinas and representatives of the above named Union and Company
appeared.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

At the outset of the hearing, Mr. Salinas stated that he
did not want his disputes with the Company decided in arbitration
that he had filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunitie
Commission; that he wanted the disputes determined solely by the
EEOC and the courts; that he would not participate in the arbitra
tion and did not want the Union to proceed in arbitration on his
behalf.
The Union stated that though it was ready and willing to
represent Mr. Salinas in the arbitration it could not do so without his participation.

The Union asked for an indefinite adjourn-

ment of the arbitration hearing.
request.

The Company opposed the Union's

I ruled that in the absence of a mutual request for or

an agreement on an adjournment, I was prepared to proceed with
the hearing and would entertain motions.

-2The Company moved that Mr. Salinas1 grievance be dismissed
with prejudice because of the failure of the Union to proceed
with the arbitration in view or Mr. Salinas' refusal to participate and his position that he wanted his case decided in another
forum.

I granted the Company's motion.

Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Impartial Chairman under the collective bargaining agreement
between the above named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The grievance of Mr. Rafael Salinas
and the Union's request for arbitration on his behalf, are dismissed
with prejudice. The rights, if any,
of Mr. Salinas and the parties in any
other forum are reserved.

DATED: March 22, 1984
STATE OF New York)ss>.
COUNTY OF New York)

Erio'J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

\,

